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This paper explores the link between environmental quality and economic
growth in an endogenous growth model that incorporates pollution-saving tech-
nological change. It examines the conditiona under which austaínable growth ia
both feasible and optimal. We explore also how the government should intervene
to ensure the optimal levels of natural and knowledge capital, which have a public-
goods character. Furthermore, the long-run effects of an increased concern for the
environment are examined. In particular, we establish the conditiona for a more
ambitious environmental policy to raise long-run growth.
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1 Introduction
Does a better quality of the natural environment require lower economic growth? Dces
economic growth constitute a fatal threat to the natural environment? These contro-
versial issues o[ten feature in discussions about environmental policy, in general, and
sustainable growth, in particular. Peasimiats argue that the natural environment can
survive only at zero or negative growth rates. Optimista, in contrast, maintain that
high rates of growth can be compatible with a clean envimnment. Indeed, in their view,
'win-win' opportunities (see, e.g. World Bank (1992)) often exist in which policy can
simultaneously enhance environmental quality and productive capacity.
This paper explores the link between environmental quality and sustainable economic
growth. In particular, we examine the conditions under which growth in physical output
is sustainable and compatible with a stable quality of the natural environment. We
also investigate which policy instruments the government should adopt to ensure that a
decentralized market economy reaches a sustainable growth path. Finally, we investigate
how an increase in environmental concern affects the long-term rate ot growth.
We develop a two-sector endogenous growth model ín which economic activity de-
pends on the extractive use of the natural environment which is modeled as a renewable
resource. In particular, production requires inputs that inevitably pollute the environ-
ment (e.g. pe.sticides in agriculture, fossil fuels resulting in emissions of carbon) or that
directly harvest nature (e.g, water, wildlife, fish, wood, etc.). This extractive use of
the environment adversely affects environmental quality. The pollution-assimilating and
self-generating capacities of the environment, however, allow for a certain sustainable
flow o[ pollution, which matches the biological regeneration rate. '1'he atock of natural
re~source~ has a posit.ive valuc- bcxausr its amc~nity enters ntilit.y (e,.R. thr efli~ct of air
quality on health, the aesthetic value of unspoiled landscapes). Moreover, the environ-
ment has a productive role in that it yields public non-extractive services that act as
an input into production (the carrier services of the environment, which supply physical
and mental support to productive activitiea, e.g. the impact of soil and air quality on
productivity in the agricultural sector and on labor productivity, more generally).2
Neo-classical growth models have been employed to atudy the link between envi-
ronmental policy and economic growth (see, e.g. Foater (1973), Van der Plceg and
Withagen (1991), and Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991)). We extend this literature
in two directions. First, in traditional neo-classical modela, (environmental) policies do
not impact long-run growth because reproducible factora exhibit diminishing returns.
Hence, if the reproducible inputa grow relative to the non-reproductable factora, their
marginal products eventually fall back to zero. The long-run growth rate is thus exoge-
nously determined by the growth rate of thc non-reproducible inputs (e.g. labor, natural
resources). We, in contrast, assume - in the spirit of the so-called 'new' growth the-
ory - that reproducible factors do not necessarily feature diminishing returns (see also
Ligthart and Van der Plceg (1992)). In this way, the steady-state growth rate becomes
endogenous. Hence, environmental policy may impact long-run growth.
The second extension of the literature on growth and the environment involves the
modeling of endogenous pollution-saving technological progreas. Building on the work of
Lucas (19H8) and R.ebelo (1991), we model the development of new technical knowledge
that enables production to occur in a less polluting way and to use renewable resources
more effiiciently. Within this framework, there are two reasons for government interven-
tion, namely that both environmental quality and pollution saving knowledge have a
public good character. We find that, on an optimal balanced growth path, the revenues
from pollution taxes (or pollution permits) exceed public expenditures on the develop-
ment of pollution-saving technology, and Lhat the optimal size of the government budget
tends to increase with growing environmental concern.
A more ambitious environmental policy affects the long-run rate oí growtl~ in two
opposing directions. On the one hand, allowing a lower level of polluting inputs and
harvested resources implies a fall in the productivity of reproducible inputs, thereby
hurting growth. On the other hand, the reduction in pollution improves the quality of
the environment, which positively affects productivity and growth. The aecond effect
may outweigh the first if environmental quality not only enters utility but alao has an
important productive role.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the3
optimum conditions for a command economy. The feasibility and optimality of balanced
growth requires particular conditions on technology and preferences. These conditions
are derived in Section 3. Section 4 explores how the government should intervene in a
market economy to ensure the optimal allocation. Section 5 examines the steady-state
effects of a more ambitious environmental policy, which is associated with a decline in
economy-wide pollution, on a number of variablea such as on economic growth, the real
rate oí return, the bias of technological change as indicated by the knowledge-intenaity
of production, the ratio of consumption to assets, and the ratio of public to private
spending. Section 6 demonstrates that an increase in environmental concern is associated
with a lower optimal pollution level. Accordingly, the results contained in Section 5 can
be interpreted as the long-run effects of a shift toward 'greener' preferences. Finally,
Section 7 contains the conclusions.
2 The model
Environmental quality
Economic activity is embedded ín the natural environment, which is modeled as a renew-
able resource. The quality of the natural environment N, which is the stock of natural
capital, accumulates due to the regenerative capacity of nature while it depreciates on
account of the damaging effects of pollution P. Here, N evolves over time according to
the following regeneration function (see Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991)):
N - d~ - E(N, P)
Ep~O Epp~O
Err~r G O E~yp G O
E(IV(P), P) - 0
The dot represents a time derivative. The subscripts attached to the function symbol E
denote partial derivatives.
For each level of pollution (or emissions) P, there exists a stable level ofenvironmental
quality N for which nature regenerates itself such that environmental quality remains4
constant over time. Rzising the level of pollution, which can be interpreted as increasing
the rate of harvest of the renewable reaource, reducea the regenerative capacity (or ab-
sorption capacity) of the environment, cauaing N to fall to a lower level (i.e. ~ G 0).
For this level to be stable, it is assumed that EN(N, P) c 0 around N(P). Thia implies
that natural capital becomes more productive as a nature regenerating kind of capital if
it becomes scarcer. Starting from a very low natural capital atock (N GG N), a rise in
N is likely to increase the absorption capacity (EN(N, P) 1 0). After a certain point,
however, congestion (e.g. overpopulation) occurs and, hence, the regenerative capacity
declines with N (see Figure 1).
Production
Two sectors make up the production side of the economy (as in Lucas (1988) and Rebelo
(1991)). One sector produces a final output that can be either consumed or invested
for the purpose of accumulating capital. Accordingly, we call this sector the final- or
consumption-goods sector or, alternatively, the capital-producing sector.
The second sector, which we name the knowledge- or learning sector, generatea knowl-
edge about pollution-saving techniques. It is a pure 'investment sector' because the out-
put is not used for consumption but only for the purpose of accumulating technological
knowledge.
The final good, Y, is produced according to the following technology:
Y - Y(N, Kr, Zr) (2.2)
The first input is the aggregate stock of natural capita! (N). Clean soil and air provide
productive services to economic activities (e.g. healthy workers, small physical depreci-
ation of equipment). The second input, Ky, represents the stock of 'manmade' capital
allocated to the final goods sector. Capital K is interpreted as a broad measure of capi-
tal. It includes all capital that can be produced (and accumulated by allocating resources
to economic activities~, such as physical capital and human capital. However, it excludes5
knowledge capital directly related to pollution. For convenience we label K as physical
capital.
The third input, Zy, represents effective input of 'harveated' environmental resources
in the consumption goods sector. No production is feasible without pollution. However,
pollution-saving technical progress is possible. In particular, the productive content of
pollution depends on the available knowledge about pollution-saving techniques, repre-
sented by h. Therefore, Zy can be written as vhP where P stands foc the economy-wide
level o[ pollution (which affects the quality of the environment, see equation (2.1)),
hP - Z represents the 'effective' level of pollution that is productive in economic activi-
ties, and v is the share of effective pollution for which the final goods sector ia responsible.
The stock of knowledge h is separated from the kinds of 'man-made' capital included
in K, so that we can explicitly study the role of pollution-saving technology. The ac-
cumulation oC pollution-saving knowledge requires investment in the learning sector. In
particular, the following technology describes the growth of technical knowledge:
h- II - H(KH, ZH) - óHh (2.3)
whcre ó~~ stands for the dcprcciation rate of technological knowledge. The inputs into
the knowledge sector are physical capital ( KN) and effective pollution ( Zy -(1-v)hP).
Summing up, the model incorporates thrce kinds of capital: natural capital (N),
'physical' capital (K), and pollution-saving knowledge capital (h). N and h are accumu-
lated according to equations (2.1) and (2.3) respectively, while a standard accumulation
equation links the evolution of the stock of economy-wide physical capital to investment,
Y-C:
K-Y-C-ó~,-K (2.4)
where C denotes consumption and éK represents the rate of physical depreciation. Be-
sides distinguishing between natural capital (N) and 'man-made' capital (h and K),6
one can distinguish between rival capítal (K) and nonrival capital (N and h). Physical
capital, K, (as well as pollution, P) is rival in the senae that eacó unit can be employed
in only one of the two sectora. The allocation of the total stock K- KN f Ky is
characterized by u- Ky~K (cf. v- Zy~Z). Technological knowledge h is non-rival; it
increases production in both sectors.
Preferencea
'The economy is populated by L identical infinitely-lived individuals witó preferencea
over consumption goods and environmental quality:
f~ e-B`U(c(t), N(t))dt (2.5)
0
where B represents the rate of time preference and c- C~L denotes per capita conaump-
tion. As a non-rival good, N features in both production (2.2) and individual utility
(2.5).
Optimal atatic allocation
Given the total amount of capital (K - Ky f Ky) and effective pollution (Z - Zy-}-Zy),





qZ - ázy - qháZH
where q~, denotes the shadowprice of knowledge relative to physical capital and qZ can
be interpreted as the shadow price of effective pollution. The first (second) condition
states that the marginal product of physical capital (effective pollution), measured in
terms of units of physical capital, should be the same in the two sectors.7
The decision on the optirnal level of pollution, given the optimal allocation, ie also ofa
static nature. Optimality requires that the marginal benefit of pollution (in both sectors)
eyuals its marginal cost, which is the deterioration of the quality of the environment N:
qZh - -EPQN
where qN stands for the shadowprice of N relative to that of K.
Optimal dynamic allocation
Investment in the three kinds of capital (K, h and N) should be traded off against each
other and against consumption:
aY aH )
r- aKr - bti - aZy F' t qh - bN - ~aN, ac } aN 1-F QN - 6N (2.9
QN 9N
r-BfL-Uc (2.10)
where bN --!;N(N, P), which is positive around N, can be interpreted as the depreci-
ation rate of natural capital. Arbitrage condition (2.9) reveals that K, h and N should
yield the same return. The return on capital amounts to its marginal product (i.e. the
dividends or current benefits, which are equal in both sectors as required by the optimal
vectoral allocation (2.6)) rninus depreciation. Dividends and depreciation also feature in
the return on knowledgc, but here also changes in the relative price (i.c. capital gains)
should be taken into account. Furthermore, the marginal product of effective pollution is
multiplied by economy-wide pollution P. This reflects the non-rival nature of knowledge.
Also the return on natural capital consists of dividends, capital gains and a depreciation
allowance. Since natural capital is nonrival in nature, dividends amount to the aum of
the marginal benefits of natural capital in individual utility and production.
Equation (2.10) stands for the well-known Ramsey rule representing the trade-off
between investment and consumption. Postponement of consumption must be rewarded8
by a rate of return that compensates for the pure rate of time preference, the rate of
population growth (which decreases ceteris paribus per capita consumption), and the
change over time in the (marginal) value of consumption (U~).
3 Conditions for balanced endogenous growth
Growth in output can be achieved by investing in knowledge as well as natural and
physical capital aud by increasing pollution. We focus on balanced growth, defined as
a situation in which allocative variables (u - Ky~K, v- Zy~Z,C~Y) are constant and
in which all other variables change at constant (possibly zero) rates. This requires some
restrictions on ecological relationships, technology and preferences.
Ecological relationships
Since we assurne Lhat thc euvironment evolve:e according Lo (`l.l), the stock of environ-
mental services can grow at a constant rate only if pollution is reduced at an accelerating
rate. Hence, on a balanced growth path, the quality of the environment, N, and the
aggregate level of pollution, P, have to be constant.
Technology
With P, N,C~Y,u and v constant, growth in output is fuelled by sustained increases in
knowledge and physical capital. The relative change in the growth rates of these two
assets can be written as:
K )h 9n - ~KH K } (~ZH - 1 h
9n
9n - (aKY - 1)h -~ az,, h 9F
where g~ denotes the growth rate o( j and a; stands for thc~ product,ion elasticity of factor
i. Balanced growth requires gh - gK - 0 or equivalently (cL Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin9
(1992)):
~tix I - aKy - 9h
I - azx - ~zy - 9x
This condition has implications for the elasticities of subatitution and the degrees of
economies of scale in both sectors. [n a aituation of balanced growth, natural capital
becotnes scarcer relative to the production factors Ky and 7,y, since it remaina constant
while K and h grow steadily. If natural capital is a production factor in the Y-sector
(8Y~8N ~ 0, see (2.2)), the production elasticities aKy and azy change over time
unless the elasticity ot substitution between, on the one hand, natural capital and, on
the other hand, physical capital and effective pollution is unity. Since balanced growth
requires (3.3) to be satisfied at each moment in time, production elasticities ahould be
constant.~ Accordingly, the elasticity ot substitution between natural capital and the
other production factors should equal one.
As far as economics of scale are concerned, either both sectors should exhibit con-
stant returns to scale with respect to physical capital and effective pollution (CRS), or
decreasing returns to scale ( DRS) in one sector should be compensated by increasing
returns to scale (IRS) in the other (e.g. if the ratio (3.3) exceeds 1, and the growth of
knowledge thus exceeds growth of physical capital, the knowledge sector exhibits IRS,
~F,, ~~z,, ~ l, while the consumption good sector features DRS, ahy ~ azy C 1). If both
sectors would exhibit DRS, the marginal productivity of both factors would decline and
growth would thus vanish. With IRS in both scctors, in contravt, growth rates would
accelerate.
With CR.S in both sectors, capital and knowledge grow at a common rate (i.e.
9K~9n - 1). Hence, the production elasticities a; remain constant over time, irrespective
of the elasticity of substitution between effective pollution and capital in the Y-sector
(denoted by oy) and the corresponding elasticity in the H-sector (denoted by oy).
~ Strictly speaking, only the ratios in (3.3) ahould be constant. Assuming a production funttion that is
homogeneous of(afixed) degree y in K and Z, we can write the ratioas: (1-axr )~azr - lt(1-7)~azr
since by dcfinition y - aK, tazr. Accordingly, either the production e~asticitiesa; have to be conatant
or the production function shouW exhibit CRS in K and T. (i.e. y- 1).10
However, if one sector exhibits IRS and the other DRS, capital and knowledge grow
at different ratea (i.e. gK~g~, ~ 1). Consequently, the production elasticitiea a; would
change over time, thereby violating (3.3), unlesa oy - oy - 1. Therefore, production
functions in both sectors stiould be of the Cobb-Douglas type for balanced growth to
be feasible. If the substitution elasticitiea would exceed unity, factors of production are
good substitutes and the factor produced in the aector exhibiting IRS would gradually
replace the other factor. Intuitively, the IRS sector dominates the DRS sector which im-
plies an accelerating growth rate in the long run.~ If the substitution elasticities would
fall short of unity, in contrast, factors of production are poor substitutes. Consequently,
the factor produced in the sector exhibiting DRS cannot easily be replaced by the other
factor and growth thus slows down.
We focus on the case with CRS (with respect to physical capital and effective
pollution)3 in both sectors and substitution elasticities between physical capital and
effective pollution (oy and oy) below or equal to one. This represents the case where
production cannot take place without pollution (pollution is essential: oy,oy G 1).
Hence, sustained pollution saving technological progress is necessary to keep the econ-
omy growing. The production functions in (2.2) and (2.3) can now be specified as:
Y- Ay(N) - F(Ky, Zy), A'y 1 0, Ay c 0 (3.4)
h- H- Ay - C(KH, ZN) (3.5)
where, for simplicity we abstract from depreciation of capital or knowledge (i.e. áK -
6H - 0).
~If we would require only asymptotically balanced growth, we could have CRS in one aector and DRS
in the other with elasticitiea of substitution larger than one. Asymptotically the DRS sector vanishes,
the CAS sector dominates and growth approximatee a constant rate. This is the case explored by
Jonea and Manuelli (1990). In our setting, we could asaume that pollution saving knowledge can be
atcumulated only subject to DRS, or - as an extreme case - that it cannot be accumulated. In this case,
growth could be sustained if pollution is nonessential (oy ~ 1) and growth would be asymptotically
conatant i[ the Y-sector exhibits CRS. However, pollution would not play any productive role in the
long run.
3If N enters the Y-aector, the production function for Y features IRS in N, Zy and Ky.11
If both sectors exhibit CRS, capital and knowledge grow at a common rate, say g.
At the same time, the marginal products of these two factors and the relative price q~,
and Qz remain constant (see (2.7)). However, the fixed fsetore N and P become acarcer
as the economy grows and the marginal productivities of these factors thua grow at rate
g. Also, the relative, price of the natural environment (qN) grows at that rate. Hence,
balanced growth is characteriaed by:
K h C ~ Y qN
K-h-C-c-Y-9N-g,
N- P- qn - 4z - 0. (3.6)
where we ignore population growth (L - 0).
Preferences
While the restrictions on technology guarantee that a balanced growth path is Jeasióle,
restrictions on preferences are required to guarantee that balanced growth is optimal.
Optimal growt.h is halancr.d if the ratc of return is constant. If C grows at rate g and N
rernains constant, this rcquires that:
(i) marginal utility of consumption rises at a constant rate (see the Ramsey rule (2.10))
(ii) the ratio L~ áu á~ rncreases at the same rate (g) as qN and 8Y~8N (see the
arbitrage condition for N on the right-hand-side of (2.9)).
Marginal utility evolves over time according to
U~ - `UUcI c ~ `UUNI N ~
where subscripts denote the partial derivatives of the instantaneous utility function.
Marginal utility grows at a constant rate if the intertemporal substitution elasticity
(-U~~U~~c - v, see term in the first brackets) is constant, i.e. independent of the scale
of consumption and independent of the ratio of N to c. This requires a time-separable12
constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function. Since C grows at rate g, the
second restriction on preferences requires that (LUN~U ).(N~C) - U1vN~U~c remains
constant in the steady state. The elasticity of UN~U~ with reapect to c must be unity. As
shown by King, Rebelo and Plosser ( 1988), this implies that the elasticity of substitution
in utility between consumption and some index of environmental services should equal
unity.~ Intuitively, in a growing economy, the shadow price of environmental services
rises, thereby providing an incentive to substitute consumption of produced goods for
environmental services. The optimal stock of natural capital remains constant only if
this negative substitution effect on the demand for environmental services is exactly
offset by the positive income effect triggered by output growth. This requires that the
elasticity of substitution is unity.
The initial steady-state equilibrium
The shares of capital in the production of final goods and knowledge in the initial equi-
librium are denoted by, respectively, a- F~F~) and Q- ~~K~l. On a balanced
growth path, the shares u and v can be expressed as (see Appendix A):




v- Z - r
where r and g denote, respectively, the real rate of return and the rate of economic
growth. If the interest rate equals the growth rate, the entire output of the capital-
~Theee authora explore a utility functíon with consumption and leieure (which ehould be conatant
in the steady etate as N in our case) ae argumenta. Inatantaneoua utility that satiafiea the required
restri~tions looks like:
U-~oo t~ c'-~~".n(N), with n' 10 and n" G 0 if o] 1 and n' G 0 and n" ~ 0 if o G l.13
producing sector is invested (i.e. C- 0)S. In that case, the fraction of capital allocated
to the capital-producing sector, u, corresponda to the ahare of capital in that sector, a.
At the same time, the pollution share in the knowledge-creating sector, 1-~, equals the
fraction of economy-wide pollution employed in that sector, 1- v. If the interest rate
exceeds the growth rate and consumption thua becomes positive, the fractions of the two
rival production factors employed in the conaumption-good sector rise (i.e. u 1 a and
v~~). Indeed, these shares are related positively (aee also Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1992)). fíence, an increase in the share of capital allocated to the consumption-good
sector is a.vsociated with a larger share of pollution employed in that sector.
The fractions u and v are linked to the shares a and ~ according to (from (3.8) and
(3.9)):
`v u u~ - (~ a ~) `~~ (3.10)
Expression (3.10) reveals that a relatively large fraction of economy-wide pollution is
allocated to the pollution-intensive sector. In the rest of this paper we will generally
assume that the consumption-good sector is relatively pollution intensive (~ ~ a). In
that case, the fraction of aggregate pollution allocated to this sector, v, exceeds the
corresponding fraction of economy-wide capital employed in that sector, u.
4 Market equilibrium
Without government intervention, the decentralised market economy suffers from two
market failures, which are a.gsociated with the public-good character of the environment
N and knowledge h. These goods are not provided in a pure market economy. With re-
spect to the natural environment, each individual consumer and each individual producer
in the final goods sector benefits from the quality of the environment (i.e. 8U~8N 1 0
and 8Y~8N ~ 0). However, since this quality depends on aggregate pollution, individual
SSee expression (C.7) in Appendix C.14
consumers and producers ignore the effecta of their deciaions on N. Indeed, without
government intervention, producers would face no cost at all a.gsociated with pollution,
but only a benefit (8Y~8ZY ~ 0 and 8H~8Zy ~ 0). Therefore, they would select an
infinitely large level of pollution. As a consequence of the tragedy of the commons, the
quality of the environment would decline to unsustainably low levels and neither pro-
duction nor life would be possible. Social mechanisms are needed to prevent this. For
example, the government may levy tax on emissions. Alternatively, it may create the
missing market for pollution permits hy auct.ioning off such prrmits.
Knowledge h is a nonrival and thus a public good. The cost of acquiring knowledge
is a fixed cost; once acquired the knowledge can be applied at any scale of operation.
The existence of fixed costs implies economies of scale so that perfect competition is not
viable. Or, to put in another way, iï perfect competition were present, after paying the
rival factors of production their marginal product (including the tax on pollution) no
quasi-rent would be left to pay for h. Hence, pollution saving technological innovation
would not be rewarded and thus no research would be undertaken. Accordingly, the
government should pay for the development of new technology and freely provide the
knowledge Lo finns.
The government thus ncrcJs to intervene to ensure the optimal Ievels of the two public
goods N and h. The provision of N yields public revenne as the government charges a
cost for the use of the environment. The development of pollution-saving knowledge, in
contrast, absorbs public means. It is of some interest to explore the relative magnitudes
of revenues and expenditures asscx~iated with optimal environmental policy.
Firms equate the marginal product of pollution, given the available pollution saving
technology, to the cost of pollution:
af ázYh-TP
where rP denotes the pollution tax, which can alternatively be interpreted as the price
of pollution permits. Combining this cquilibrium condition with optimality condition15
(2.7), we find for the optimal tax on pollution:
TP - ~ÍZ ' ~t
In tht` stcady state, the optimal tax rises at rate h~h - g to prevent pollution from
rising and Lhc environment from deteriorating. Sustained innovation raises the marginal
productivity of pollution. This providea an incentive to increase pollution unless the
pollution tax rises at the same rate.
The price (in terms of final goods) that the government pays for new technologyequals
the shadow price yn. Hence, total public spending amounts to qhH - qzhf~~zN (using
('l.7)). 'I'liis yields thi~ fullowing balauct~ betwee~n tax revcuues and research spending:
H v-Q 1
4z Z- 8H~8ZH] - 9zZ ~1 - p I (4.3)
where we used the dc.finitions of 1- j3 - ~Zyá ZN ~FI) and 1- v- Zy~Z. Since v~~ if
steady-state consumption is positive, revenues from pollution taxes (or auctioned pollu-
tion permits) are more than sufficient to finance research subsidies. The intuition is as
follows. Pollution and publicly provided knowledge are perfect substitutes in production.
}{ence, the pollution tax, which corresponds to the shadow price of pollution, directly
measures thc return on the stock of knowlPdge. At the same tirne, the optimal subsidy
corresponds to the cost of investing in this stock. As a kind of golden rule for the stock
of knowledge, it is optimal to invest only part of the returns and, thus, tax revenues
should exceed RRcD spending on the optimal balanced growth path. Accordingly, the
government should earmark only part of the pollution tax revenue for developing pollu-
tion saving knowledge capital. Moreover, the public goods can be entirely finaneed by
non-distortionary taxes. This is in contrast to Rarro (1990)s
alf n equale (~,u and v are equal at each point in time (see (3.10)). In that case, we can interpret
L- u- I- u as the share of output devoted to the production of the public input. This model reaembles
that of Barro (1990). The main diflerence is that the publit input ia a atock of public capital that needa
Lo be acannulated rather than instantaneous public servicea.16
5 Exogenous environmental policy
This section discusses the comparative statics of the steady-state solutiona for sectoral
factor intensities (Subsection 5.1), the real ratea of return and growth (Subsection 5.2),
the allocation of the rival inputs across the two sectora (Subaection 5.3), the direction
oí technological change as measured by the capital-knowledge ratio K~h (Subsection
5.4), the ratio of consumption to capital and knowledge (Subsection 5.5), the tax on
pollution (Subsection 5.6), the price of knowledge (Subsection 5.7), and the ratio of
public to private spending (Subsection 5.8). Each subsection starts by exploring the
long-run effects of shocks in the productivity parameters Ay and Ap. This discussion
sets the stage for the investigation of the steady-state impact of an exogenous reduction
in economy-wide pollution. Hence, in this section environmental policy is exogenous in
the sense that the amount of pollution is not set optimally. However, Section 6 shows that
the cut in pollution analyzed in Section 5 can be interpreted as an endogenous response
to a change in preferences towards more environmental concern. When investigating
the consequences of cutting pollution, we first examine the case in which environmental
yuality leaves production uuaffected (i.e. dAy~dN - 0) before exploring the case in
which environmental quality features as a production factor in the consumption-goods
sector (i.e. dAy~dN ~ 0). ln this lat.ter case, pollut.ion affects long-run productivity
according to (see Appendix D):
.Ay - -ay `EivNI P
where a tilde ~ denotes a mlativechange and where ay is the elasticity of Ay with respect
to N:
(dAy~dN)N
ay - A .
y
Table 1 contains a summary of the findings in this section.
5.1 Sectoral factor-intensities
The long-run solutions for the sectoral capital-efíective pollution ratios are given by (see
Appendix A):17
1 1 Ay-ïty-P
oy ~hY - PY~ - óy ~1Ky - Py~ - ( 1 - a f ~ )
(5.1)
Productivity shocks
The factor produced by the more productive sector becomes more abundant. Ac-
cordingly, production becomes more intensive in that factor. The sectoral substitution
elasticities (oy and oy) and the shares a and ,0 determine the magnitude of the impact
on the scrctoral factor intensitiex. The larger the sectoral substitution elasticity, the more
a sector is able to absorb the more abundant production factor and thus the larger is
the impact of a relative productivity shock on the sectoral factor mix.
The sensitivity of the sectoral capital-effective pollution ratio with respect to relative
productivity shocks depends also on the share of pollution in the capital-producing sector,
1- a, and the share of capital in the knowledge-producing sector, ~. These shares are
called 'croas-shares' because they reflect the importance of capital and effective pollution
in the accumulation of the other production factor. Large cross shares mitigate the
impact of rclative productivity shocks on the sectoral factor intensities. The reason is
that larl;r cruss sliam, imply Lhat, a ruum prodnct.ive~ produet.ion proc,wx uot only msiilts
in morc accun~ulxtion of Lhe factor produced by that sector but also indirectly yields
more of the factor produced by the other sector as the more abundant factor plays an
important role in the production of the other production factor.
Environmental policy ( l' ~ 0 with ny - 0)
I:nvirunm~~ntal pulicy (!' -; 0) causes productiuu to become Ic~ss pullution intensive.
How much the sectoral capital-effective pollution ratio rises depends on the sectoral
substitution elasticity. If this substitution elasticity is large, substituting away from
pollution is relatively easy and production in that sector becomes substantially leas
pollution intensivc.
Large cross-shares (i.e. 1- a and (.i are large and thus 1- a-} Q is large) reduce
the effect of environmental policy on the sectoral factor intensities. Intuitively, if factors
play an important role in the accumulation of the other factor, the model becomesI8
'more stable' in the sense that changes in the relative abundance of the production
factors exert a smaller impact on the factot-intenaity of production. In particular, lower
pollution not only directly reduces effective pollution but also indirectly inhibits the
arcuinulation of capital if thc pollut.ion sharc in thc capital-prtxlucing scctor, 1- rr,
is large. The accumulation of pollution-saving technological knowledge, in contrast, is
not much reduced by environmental policy if pollution is not an important input in
producing that knowledge (i.e. I-~ is amall). Accordingly, the second-round effects
mitigate the impact of environmental policy on sectoral factor intensities if pollution
plays an important role in the accumulation of capital and at the same time does not
feature a large share in the accumulation of knowlcdge.
Environment as production factor (P c 0 with ay 1 0)
Production becomes even less pollution intensive if a better environmental quality
facilitates the production of capital. The reason is that a lower level of pollution raises
the long-run quality of the environment, thereby boosting the productivity of the capital-
producing sector and thus increasing the supply of capital. Accordingly, the capital-
e(fective pollution ratio rises on account of not only lower (effective) pollution but also
a larger stock of produced capitaL Intuitively, production relies less on pollution P and
more on natural and produced capital (N and K).
5.2 Real return and growth
1'he steady-state version of the Itamsey rule ('1.10) governing the intertemporal allocation
of consumption links the real return r to growth g:
r-B~-9
a




1'he efïect on econornic growth is directly related to the impact on the real return.
Crowth is especially sensitive to the real return if the intertemporal elasticity, o, and
the rate of time preference, B, are large. The effect on the real return is given by (see
Appendix A):
r- [I -a-FQ] Ay} [1 1 af~i] (Ay-i.P)
Productivity shocks
The effect of productivity shocks on the real return (5.4) is closely related to the
result derived by Rebelo (1991) for the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions.
Rebelo found that the long-run real return depends on the geometric average of the
two productivity pararneters Ay and AH with the same weights as in (5.4). Expresaion
(5.4) generalizes Rebelo's result to production functiona with non-unitary substitution
elasticities. It reveals that non-unitary substitution elasticities do not affect the impact of
productivity shocks on the real return. On the one hand, small substitution elasticities
imply that relative productivity shocks exert only a small impact on sectoral factor
intensities (see expression (5.1)). On the other hand, however, the rate of return becomes
more sensitive to changes in factor intensities if substitution becomes more difficult.
Theae two effects exactly offset each other.
The relationship between the real return and productivity is one-to-one if both sec-
tors feature the same productivity shocks (Ay - AH). The macro-economic impact
oí sectoral productivity shocks depends on the relative magnitude of the cross shares;
a productivity shock in a particular sector exerts a more substantial impact on the
economy-wide return, the larger is the cross share of the factor produced by that sector
compared to the cross sharo of the other factor. The intuition is as follows. Long-term
arbitragc between invc~stmr,nt in capital and knowledge requires that the rates of return
on the two types of investment are equal (see expression (2.9)):20
8Y 8!!
8Ky - pBZN - r (5.5)
If a productivity shock Ày ~ 0 raises the retura on capital, eKy, the equality between
the two returns in (5.5) is re-established by making production more capital-intensive.
More capital-intensive production reduces the rate of return on capital, áKY, while at
the same Lirnr~ raisiug thc return on knowlrrlgr, Pá ZH. I( pollution is an irnportant
input in the production of capital (i.e. a is small), the rate of return on capital declines
rapidly ií production becomes more capital intensive. If at the same time, the ahare of
capital in the production of knowledge, Q, is small, the rate of return on knowledge rises
only slowly. Accordingly, the arbitrage condition (5.5) is met at a relatively low return.
Accordingly, the productivity shock in the capital-producing sector is not very powerful
in raising the macro-economic rate of return and thus the growth rate.
Environmental policy (P C 0 with ay - 0)
Environmental policy reduces the long-run real return and hence harms the growth
rate. How sensitive the real return and growth are with respect to economy-wide pol-
lution depends on the cross-shares. In particular, the real return (and hence growth) is
rather sensitive to environmental policy if the (cross) share of pollution in the produc-
tion of capital, (1 - a), is large relative to the (cross) share of capital in the production
of knowledge, ~i. Intuitively, in that case, pollution plays an important role in overall
production because it accounts for a large share in the production of both capital and
knowledge (i.e. both 1- a and 1-~ are large). Environmental policy does not affect
the real return if pollution dces not enter the production of capital (i.e. a- 1). In
this case, growth in final goods output can be sustained without the need for knowledge
inputs Írom the knowledge-producing sector, or in other words: the 'core' of the model
consists only of the capital-producing sector. Since pollution does not affect the 'core',
it leaves both the real return and growth unaffected (see Rebelo (1991)). The'core' of
the model is limited to the knowledge-producing sector if capital dces not impact the
production of effective pollution (i.e. Q- 0), because then growth in final goods output21
can be sustained without growth in capital K(provided that a c 1). In that case, the
elasticity of the real return with respect to the economy-wide level of pollution is (at its
maximum of) unity.
Environment as production factor (P C 0 with ay ~ 0)
Environmental policy may facilitate long-run growth if a better environmental quality
N enhances the productivity o( the consumption-goods sector and t.he environment is
thus not only a consumption good but also a production factor. The condition for an
improvcd growth performance is (from (5.3) and (5.4)):
EPP (5.6) Q ay ~ (1 - a) `ENNI
Growth improves ii a change in pollution affects strongly the absorption capacity of
nature (-EP large), if the negative feedback of a higher stock of natural capital on
the absorption capacity is small (-EN small) and if the positive impact of a higher
environmental quality on productivity is large (i.e. aY large). Furthermore, the share
of capital in the knowledge-producing sector, Q, should be large relative to the share
of pollution in the capital-producing sector, (1 - a). Intuitively, the positive impact
of environmental quality on productivity Ay should dominate its adverse effect on the
absorption capacity of the environment. Furthermore, capital K and environmental
quality N should be relatively important in production (i.e. ,B and ay should be large)
while pollution should feature only small production shares (i.e. 1- a and 1-(~ should
be small). Hence, the positive effect on the production sector of more abundant (natural
and produced) capital dominates the adverse effect of lower pollution.
5.3 The sectoral distribution of economic activity
The expression for the share of effective pollution allocated to the capital-producing
sector, v, consists of two terms, one representing the impact of relative productivity
shocks and the other the effect of aggregate productivity shocks (see Appendix B):zz
v r v l Q(1 - oy) ~Ay - Ay - Pl
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Relative productivity shocka (Áy - Áy)
The first term at the right-hand side of (5.7) represents the impact of changes in
the relative productivity of the two production processea. The sector that becomes
relatively less productive attracts a larger share of economy-wide pollution as long as
the substitution elasticity in the knowledge-producing sector is smaller than unity (i.e.
Oy G 1).
Intuitively, a relative productivity shock exerts both a scale and a suóstitution effect.
The scale effect implies that the more productive sector requires less production factors
to supply the same output. At the same time, however, production becomes more
intensive in the factor produced by the more productive sector (see Subsection 5.1). This
substitution effect boosts output in the more productive sector (relative to production
in the other sector). Accordingly, relative demand for production factora in the more
productive sector expands. The importance of this latter (substitution) effect depends
on the substitution possibilities between the two factors. If the substitution elasticity is
smaller than one, the scale effect dominates the substitution effect and a latger share of
pollution is thus allocated to the less productive sector. The following expression for the
fraction of economy-wide capital allocated to the consumption-good sector, u, reveals
that similar forces are operating on this fraction (see Appendix B):
u ( v ) - ~(or - vy)(v - Q) - Q(1 - oy)) ( Ay
- Áy - P~
-
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In particular, if the substitution elasticity in the capital-producing sector, oy, is small,
capital moves toward the less productive sector.23
Aggregate productivity ahocks (r)
The aggregate productivity term in (5.7) and (5.8) can be written as (from r-
(9~a) -F- 9)):
`r B BI r- a`9I r
(5.9)
lf aggregate productivity and hence the real return rises, activity declines in the con-
sumption goods sector as long as the rate of time preference, 6, and the intertemporal
substitution elasticity, o, are positive (substitute (5.9) into (5.7) and (5.8)). Intuitively, a
higher return boost.s the growth rate if intertemporal subatitution in consumption ia fea-
sible. Fligher growLl~ pulls activity away from tbe consumption-goods sector and toward
the pure 'investment' sector (i.e. the knowledge-creating sector). The aggregate pro-
ductivity effect becomes more powerful in affecting the intersectoral allocation if elastic
saving behavior (i.e. a large intertemporal substitution elasticity o) implies a substantial
response of growth to changes in aggregate productivity.
Environmental policy (P G 0 with ay - 0)
Less pollution (i.e. P G 0) enters the expressions for v and u in the same way as an
adverse productivity shock in the knowledge-crcating sector (i.e. Ay G 0). The reason
is that the long-run supply of ejjective pollution is reduced ín the same way by less
pollution as by a less productive, learning sector. How environmental policy affects the
intersectoral allocation of production (actors thus depends on the impact of the relative
and aggregate productivity effects. On the one hand, by reducing the relative supply of
effective pollution (i.e. the relative productivity effect), environmental policy expands
the knowledge-creating sector, especially if substitution in production is difficult (i.e. oy
and aH are small, see the first terms at the right-hand sides of (5.7) and (5.8)). On the
other hand, less pollution harms aggregate productivity and thus growth, thereby moving
activity into the consumption-good sector (see the last terms at the right-hand sides of
(5.7) and (5.8)). This latter impact of environmental policy becomes more important if24
the intertemporal substitution elasticity is large. If both intertemporal substitution in
consumption and aubatitution in production ia difficult, the firat effect dominates and
environmental policy thus expands the sector producing pollution-saving technology. ~
Intuitively, to substitute for pollution, the economy invests mainly in knowledge instead
of either investing in physical capital (, which would happen if substitution in production
would be easy) or consuming (, which would happen if intertemporal substitution of
consumption would be easy).
Section 3 established that pollution is 'essential' in production if substitution elas-
ticities do not exceed unity. Hence, environmental policy typically boosts the sector
producing pollution-saving technological progress unless the intertemporal substitution
elasticity is large. In the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions (i.e. ay - ay - 1),
however, substitution between capital and pollution is relatively easy and the economy
would thus substitute quite a lot of capital for pollution. Indeed, activity would move
to the capital-producing sector if both the rate of time preference and the intertempo-
ral substitution elasticity are positive. Intuitively,the relative productivity effect would
leave the intersectoral allocation unaffected (i.e. the first terms on the right-hand sides
of (5.7) and (5.8) would be zero). At the same time, the intertemporal substitution effect
on account oí lower aggregate productivity would move activity to the consumption-good
sector.
The environment as production factor (P c 0 with ay 1 0)
If the quality of the environment raises the productivity of the capital-producing sec-
tor, environmental policy is even more likely to raise activity in the knowledge-producing
sector. The reason is that the relative productivity effect becomes stronger while the
aggregate productivity effect becomes weaker and may even change sign. It becomes
more attractive to employ production factors in developing pollution-saving technologies
~The ehare of capital allocated to the knowledge-creating sector may fall if substitution in the capital-
producing sector is easy and, at thesame time, substitution in the knowledge-producingsector is difficult.
In that case, the capital-producing sector absorbs a relatively large share of the decline in pollution (see
expression (5.1)). Only in that sector can capital substitute for pollution. Hence, capital moves to the
capital-producing sector.25
because investing becomes more attractive relative to consuming (intertemporal subati-
tution) and because effective pollution becomes even more xarce relative to capital.
5.4 The knowledge-intensity of economy-wide production
1'he effect on the overall knowledge-intensity of production, K~h, can be written as the
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The first term represents substitution between capital and effective pollution on the
sectoral level as a result of relative productivity shocks. It corresponds to the effects
on sectoral factor-intensities considered in Subsection 5.1. In particular, production
becomes more intensive in the factor that becomes 'easier' to produce as a result of
the relative productivity shock. The economy-wide importance of factor substitution
on the sectoral level depends on the ease of substitution as reflected in the 'aggregate'
substitution elasticity o„ defined as the weighted averageof the two sectoral subatitution
elasticities:
o„-uoy-}.(1-u)oy (5.11)
Hence, the first term vanishes if substitution on the micro level is not feasible (i.e.
av - o~i - 0).
The second term stands for substitution between capital and knowledge as a result
of different sectoral factor-intensities. This is called 'macro-economic' substitution as
opposed to substitution at the sectoral level considered in Subsection 5.1. In particular,26
production on the macro level becomea more capital intenaive if economic activity moves
toward the sector that is relatively capital intenaive. If the knowledge-creating sector is
relatively capital intensive (i.e. ~~ a), for example, the aggregate capital-knowledge ra-
tio (K~h) rises if production factora move to that aectore As discussed in Subaection 5.3,
the knowledge-creating sector expands if this aector becomea relatively less productive
(as long as oy G 1) or aggregate productivity riaes (as long as B and o are positive).
The last term at the right-hand side of (5.10) refiecta aubatitution between, on the one
hand, pollution and, on the other hand, knowledge about pollution-saving technology. As
pollution and knowledge are substitutes, lower pollution corresponds to more knowledge-
intensive production.
Environmental policy (P c 0 with ay - 0)
In the absence of substitution on micro and macro levels (i.e. both o„ - 0 and ~-(i),
environmental policy yields more knowledge-intensive production as knowledge substi-
tutes for pollution. Substitution on the micro level mitigatea this shift. If aubstitution
between capital and effective pollution is feasible (i.e. o„ 1 0, see the first term on the
right-hand side of (5.10)), the economy substitutes not only knowledge but also capital
for pollution. If factor-intensities are identical in both sectors (i.e. a- Q), substitution
to knowledge dominates substitution to capital as long as the substitution elasticity in
the knowledge-creating sector is smaller than one. Hence, environmental policy generally
raises the knowledge-intensity of production as measured by the capita!-knowledge ratio.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the two aubstitution effects exactly offset each other and the
capital-knowledge ratio is not affected.
If the knowledge-producing sector is most capital intensive (i.e. Q~ a, see the second
term on the right-hand side of (5.10)), environmental policy typically implies macro
substitution towards capital. With low intertemporal and interfactor substitution (i.e.
a, op and oy are small), environmental policy boosts activity in the knowledge-creating
sector (see Subsection 5.3). If this sector is relatively capital intensive, the sectoral re-
dNote that (the negative of) the term between accolades equals the expreasion for v(u~(1 - v)) on
the right-hand side of equation (5.7).27
allocation of activity raises the demand for capital. This reduces the positive impact of
environmental policy on the knowledge-intenaity of production. Intuitively, capital is an
important input in the accumulation of knowledge.
Accordingly, if the knowledge-creating aector is relatively capital-intenaive (i.e. Q~
a), macro-, and not only micro-, substitution tends to mitigate the effect of environmen-
tal policy on the knowledge-intensity of production. Only if the intertemporal elasticity
is large may macro subatitution atrengthen the trend toward more knowledge-intenaive
production. The reason is that, if intertemporal substitution is easy, the lower return
implies a shift of activity towards the consumption goods sector. Since this sector is
pollution-intensive, this raises the demand for knowledge about pollution-saving tech-
nology.
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Yroduction becomes more knowledge-intensive as long as the knowledge-creating aec-
tor is mlativcly more capital inte~nsive (i.e. ~3 ~~) and the substitution elasticities are
equal and do not exceed one (i.e. o„ G 1). Even with relatively easy substitution in the
case of Cobb-Douglas production functions, environmental policy reducea the knowledge-
intensity of production only if the creation of knowledge is relatively pollution intenaive
(i.e. 1- Q~ 1- a). In this latter case, environmental policy inhibits the creation
of knowledge because pollution in an important input in the production of knowledge.
Furthermore, lower growth boosts the consumption goods sector. Also this effect makes
production Iess knowledge intensive if the consumption-goods sector is relatively capital
intensive.28
The environment as a production factor (P G 0 witó ay ~ 0)
Ii environmental policy raises the productivity of the capital-producing sector, envi-
ronmental policy may well cause production to become more capital rather than knowl-
edge intensive. The intuition is that environmental policy expands the supply of capital
by raising the productivity of the capital-producing sector. If micro substitution is easy,
substitution from effective pollution to capital may well offaet the substitution of knowl-
edge for pollution.
If the knowledge-producing sector is most capital-intensive (i.e. ,Q ~ a), macro sub-
atitution may also work in the direction of more capital intensive production if envi-
ronmental policy enhances the productivity of the capital-producing sector. In par-
ticular, higher overall productivity stimulates saving, thereby reducing activity in the
consumption-goods sector. However, lower pollution inhibits the supply of capital if the
capital-producing sector is relatively pollution intensive (see expression (5.12)). This
mitigates the positive effect of a more productive capital-producing sector on the capital-
knowledge ratio.
5.5 Consumption to capital ratio
The long-run solution for the consumption to capital ratio, C~K, is given by (see Ap-
pendix C):
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The steady-state expression for the consumption-knowledge ratio, C~h, is found by com-
bining (5.10) and (5.13):2s
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Aggregate productivity shocks (t)
The first term in expressions (5.13) and (5.14) stands for intertemporal substitution
of consumption due to movements in the overall real rate of return. A higher real
return yields both an income and a subatitution effect. The income effect boosta the
consunrption to capital ratio. The substitution effect, in contrast, raises saving and
investment relative to consumption, thereby reducing the long-run ratio of consumption
to capital. The income effect dominates the intertemporal substitution effect if the
intertemporal substitution elasticity, o, is smaller than one.
Relative productivity shocks (P c 0 with Ay - Ay)
The impact of changes in the relative productivity of the consumption goods sector
ia repreaented by the second term in the expresaiona above. In particular,if the con-
sumption goods sector becomes rnore productive compared to the knowledge-producing
sector, consumption becomes more abundant relative to capital. Conversely, asseta (i.e.
physical capital and knowledge) rise relative to consumption if the relative productivity
of the knowledge-creating sector (i.e. the 'investment' sector) improves.
In contrast to the first two terms, the other terms in expression (5.13) for the
consumption-capital ratio have a different sign than the corresponding terms in ex-
pression (5.19 ) for the consumption-knowledge ratio. The reason is that theae latter
terms correspond to the impact of productivity shocks on the capital-knowledge ratio,
K~h. In particular, the third term reflects substitution between capital and knowledgeso
on the sectoral ('micro-economic') level. If the capital-producing sector becomes rel-
atively more productive, sectors will subetitute capital for effective pollution and the
capital-effective pollution ratio thus increasea. With more capital-intensive production,
the conaumption-capital ratio declines and the consumption-knowledge ratio rises.
The fourth term captures the effect of 'macro-economic' subatitution between cap-
ital and effective pollution on account of different sectoral factor intensities. If the
knowledge-creating sector is most capital intenaive, overall production becomes more
capital intensive if activity moves to thia sector (see Subsection 5.4).
The final term featuring economy-wide pollution enters only expression (3.13) for the
ratio of consumption to knowledge. This term stands for the substitution between pol-
lution and knowledge. Hence, the consumption to knowledge ratio rises with pollution.
Environmental policy (P c 0 with ay - 0)
Lower pollution generally reduces the consumption to knowledge ratio. Intuitively,
the adverse income effect associated with lower growth reduces consumption relative to
assets. At the same time, knowledge becomes a more important asset than capital as the
economy substitutes knowledge rather than capital for pollution. The fall in the ratio of
consumption to knowledge is particularly large if the intertemporal substitution elastic-
ity o and the substitution elasticities in production, oy and oy, are small and the capital-
producing sector is relatively pollution intensive (i.e. ~~ n and thus t- a 1 1-~i,
which irnplies that the cross elasticitic~s 1- a and ~3 are yuite large). l,ow interternporal
substitution implies that the income effect dominates the substitution effect of a lower
ratc of return and thus prevents the lower return from raising consumption relative to
assets. At the same time, substit.ution of capital for pollution is quite dif6cult becausc
o[ two reasons. First, the low substitution elasticities oy and aH inhibit substitution on
micro level. Moreover, lower pollution exerts a larger negative impact on the supply of
capital than on that of knowledge because pollution is a relatively important input into
the production of capital (i.e. 1- c~ ~ 1-~).
Indeed, environmental policy can raise the consumption-knowledge ratio only if the
intertemporal substitution exceeds unity, the knowledge sector is relatively pollution31
intensive (i.e. (3 G o), and substitution on the micro level is close to unity. In that
case, the large intertemporal substitution elasticity causes conaumption to rise relative
to assets. At the same time, capital rather than knowledge ia substituted for pollution
due to thc large elasticities on the micro level and a substantial adverse effect of lower
pollution on the production of knowledge.
The environment as a production factor (P C 0 with ay , 0)
If thi, qualil.y of t,hc environmont. features not only in utility hut also in production, the
consumption to kuowledge ratio falls less and may even rise. Three factora strengthen
consumption relative to knowledge. First, the positive income effect associated with
a higher overall level of productivity raises consumption relative to assets, at least if
the intertemporal substitution elasticity is smaller than one (so that the income effect
dominatea the subatitution effect). Second, the conaumption gaods sector becomes more
productive. Hence, consumption rises relative to assets. Finally, the composition of
assets changes towards more capital and less knowledge because the capital-producing
sector becomes more productive. Indeed, if the positive effect of a better environmental
quality on prodnction is strong enough, the capital to knowledge ratio may rise rather
than fall (see Subsection 5.4) - especially if the substitution elasticities in production
are large.
5.6 The tax on pollution
In a decentralized economy firms equate the marginal productivity of pollution to the
pollution tax rp according to (4.1). This yields the following long-run impact on the




The price for effective pollution rises if aggregate productivity increases (i.e. r 1 0)
or if a relative productivity shock causes the capital-producing sector to become more32
productive compared to the knowledge-sector (i.e. Áy - AN 1 0). Intuitively, the
marginal productivity of pollution increases if either the economy as a whole becomes
more productive (i.e. r , 0) or if a more productive final goods sector (i.e. Ay -AH ~ 0)
implies that capital becomes more abundant relative to effective pollution.
Environmental policy (P G 0) raises the price of effective pollution. This effect is
strengthened if the environment enters as a production factor in the final-goods sector
(i.e. ay ~ 0 and thus Ay ~ 0). The iatuition is that a lower level of economy-wide
pollution renders effective pollution more valuable. This is especially so if a lower level
of pollution raises the supply of final goods by making the final-good sector more pro-
ductive.
5.7 The price of knowledge





Knowledge becomes scarcer and therefore more expensive, relative to physical capital
if the capital-producing sector becomes more productive compared to the knowledge
sector (i.e. Ay - Ay ~ 0). If N does not enter production (i.e. ay - 0), environmental
policy (P G 0) reduces the price of knowledge as long as the capital-producing sector is
relatively pollution intensive (i.e. 1- a~ 1- p and thus ,0 1 a). Intuitively, a lower
level of pollution harms production most in the pollution-intensive sector. Since this
sector produces capital, capital becomes scarcer relative to knowledge. Therefore, the
value of knowledge in terms of capital declines.
If the quality of the environment facilitates production (ay ~ 0), the price of knowl-
edge may rise as environmental policy booats the supply of final goods by raising thc
productivity of the final goods sector.33
5.8 Public spending
'1'hr, rat.io yh l!~ 1~ rr.(Ior~ty Lho rrlxt.ivc importancr~ uf the public ni,ctur in a dor-rutralizrrd
market economy. Tlre impact on this ratio ie given by (see Appendix D):
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A relative productivity shock favoring the private sector (i.e. Ay - AH 1 0) boosta the
public spending ratio (as long as ay,vH G 1). lntuitively public spending becomes more
expensive and more rival production factors move toward the less productive sector (see
also Subsection 5.3). A positive aggregate productivity shock (r` ~ 0) also boosts public
spending because it favors the pure investment sector.
If the environment is not productive (ay - 0), environmental policy typically makes
public spending relatively more important. Only if intertemporal substitution and sub-
stitution in production are relatively easy may the public spending ratio fall. In that
case, the economy substitutes privately produced capital as well as private consumption
for pollution rather than publicly-produced knowledge.
Public spending is even more likely to rise if the environment enters production. The
reason is that a more productive final good sector makes private spending even less ex-
pensive (relative to public spending). Moreover, a higher level of aggregate productivity
is reflected in a higher real return, which favors investment over private consumption.
6 Optimal environmental policy
If the level of pollution is chosen optimally, the following arbitrage condition must hold
in the steady state (see 2.9):
~(UNI~~) f (8Y~8N) -
(6.1) h (aY~BZy ) - (r - 9) -f (-EN(N, P)),34
It ie optimal to invest in natural capital by reducing the level of pollution up to the
point where the marginal benefits of a higher quality of the environment (LHS) equal
the marginal costs (RHS). The benefita conaist of two componenta: first, higher utility
because oí the amenity of the stock ofenvironmental capital and second, higher produc-
tivity (if N is a factor of production). Botó components are scaled by the decline in
output through the shift to a less pollution-intensive production procesa (denominator
on LHS). The first element of the costs at the RHS represents the capital cost, which
amounts to the return on the two alternative types of investment (r), corrected for 'cap-
ital gains' on natural capital; with knowledge and phyaical capital growing at rate g,
the relative price of natural capital, which is fixed in supply on a balanced growth path,
increases at rate g. As natural capital becomes scarcer and therefore its marginal value
grows steadily, investment in natural capital is relatively attractive (the required current
return is lower than that on other assets). The second cost element at the RHS is 'de-
preciation' oí natural capital, 6N --EN(N, P) 1 0. A higher level of natural capital
reduces the absorption capacity of the environment (see Section 2).
Environmental policy can be driven by a shift in preferences that raises ceteris parióus
the marginal utility of environmental services. If N is not a factor of production
(8Y~8N - dAy~dN - 0), log-linearization of (6.1) yields:
(r-gtóN) ~.~~rE'P1PfC-h- AyfcrÀy-Ày-P ll
[ `ENNf (- 1-atíi IJ -
r(1 - U)T -[ENN(-EPIEN) f ENpJPP (Ó.i)
where ~ standa for an exogenous relative change in the marginal rate of substitution
between N and C and a represents the elasticity of UN~U~ with respect to N. A 'green'
preference shift (~ ~ 0) typically implies a decline in the optimal level of pollution.
The increased marginal utility of N is an incentive to invest more in environmental
quality which requires a reduction in pollution. Following the increase in N, the marginal
benefits of N fall while the margina] costs oí higher N and lower P rise until the arbitrage35
condition (6.2) is re-established. There is little room for combating pollution if these
feed-backs of higher N on benefits and costs are strong.
The second te.rm in square brackets represents the decline in marginal utility of natu-
ral capital in response to a higher stock of natural capital associated with lower pollution.
The marginal benefits fall quickly if marginal utility of environmental quality is dimin-
ishing rapidly with N (i.e. a large). If the abaorption capacity of the environment is not
very sensitive to changes in the environment (-EN amall), but sensitive to changes in
P(-Ep large), N rises substantially with lower P. Hence, marginal utility of N declines
rapidly.
The third and fourth terms in square brackets represents the trade-off between con-
sumption, pollution-savyig knowledge and environmental quality. The more the con-
sumption to knowledgc ratio declines in response to a reduction in pollution (see equation
(5.14)), the faster Lhe marginal utility of consurnption and the rnarginal productivity of
pollution riscs (through a fall in C and a rise in h respectively). If substitution between
effectíve pollution and capital is difficult, Lhe capital-knowledge ratio declines substan-
tially (see Subsection 5.4 ). In that case, the marginal productivity of pollution h 8Y~8Py
rises rapidly. Ifence, further cuts in pollution become more costly. The two terms in
round brackol.v on t.hc~ Ic,fl. hand sidc~ uf ((i.l ) n,llirl othc~r impacls un 1.6c, niarfiinal pro-
ductivity o( pollul.ion. '1'hc, luwcr thc lovcl of pollul.ion, thc~ high~r its niarginal value as
a factor of procluction and thus the more costly further cutting pollution becomes.
The first term on the RHS represents changes in the growth corrected cost of capital.
A decline in pollution reduces the rate of return (see expression (5.4)). Accordingly,
the marginal cost of environmental investment falls and thus provides new incentives to
reduce pollution, unless the rate of intertemporal substitution exceeds one (i.e. 0 1 1).
In this latter case, the real return (i.e. the return corrected for capital gains) rises.
'I'he reason is that the rate of growth, which yields the capital gains on natural capital,
declines by more than the rate of return. However, the - realistic - case that o G 1 does
not provide a strong stimulus to cut pollution since it is at least partly counterbalanced
by a decline in the consumption-knowledge ratio (C-h) due to a lower rate of return (see
first term at the right-hand side of (5.14)). This latter effect reduces the net benefits of36
environmental policy. According to the last term on the RHS of (6.2), the marginal cost
of environmental policy is typically riaing with reductions in pollution if the expresaion
in square brackets is positive (which is assumed in Figure 1). The reason is that natural
capital depreciatea faster at higher levels of N (i.e. ENN G 0) and this compensates the
rise in absorbtion capacity due to lower pollution (i.e. ErrP G 0).
To summarize, a higher priority for the environment cuts pollution substantially if
Ufv declines and depreciation riaes alowly with N (i.e. x and ENN small), compared to
N pollution exerta a weak impact on the accumulation of natural capital (i.e. EP~EN
small), the marginal productivity of pollution rises slowly with P(a small), and substi-
tution between capital and effective pollution is easy (oy large and the crosa-elasticities
are large so that production does not become more knowledge intensive very rapidly).
Environment ae production factor (ay ~ 0)
The positive link between the quality of the environment and productivity in the con-
sumption goods sector provides additional incentives for environmental policy. However,
if this link is subject to strongly diminishing returns (i.e. A'y'N~A'y GG 0), the impact
of a preference shift on the optimal level of pollution is mitigated becauae a higher level
oí N sharply reduces the marginal contribution of natural capital to production. More-
over, if natural capital plays an important role in production (Ay large), a higher level
of N raises the marginal productivity of other production factors, including pollution.
Hence, the costs of environmental policy rise with higher levels of N. Furthermore, if
substitution in production is difficult, lower pollution raises the knowledge intensity of
production. This raises the marginal productivity of pollution h8Y~8Py, thereby in-
creasing the costs of environmental policy. If the productivity term (i.e. the second term
on the LIIS of 6.1) dominates the utility tcrm (i.e. the first term), thc effects of the
productivity term determine the impact of a given preference shock on the quality of the
environment. In particular, N rises substantially if substitution in production ia easy
(i.e. oy and oy large).
With natural capital directly productive, the effect on the growth-corrected rate of
return will be changed. In particular, a lower level of pollution produces a smaller decline37
o[ the rate of rPturn and may even raise the rate of return (see expression (5.6)). If o C 1,
the highe,r return nlakcw cuvironrneutal policy less attractive and thus rnlucew the impact
of a green preference shock.
The productivity effects of N also change the effecta on the utility component of the
current returns (i.e. the first term at the LHS of (6.1)). As discussed in Subsection
5.5, a lower level of pollution tends to produce a amaller fall in C~h and may actually
raise this ratio ií environmental capital is productive. This atrengthens the effect of
a preference shock on steady state environmental quality. However, a higher stock of
natural capital raises the cost of cutting pollution by raising the marginal productivity
of pollution ~)}'~~)Py. 'I'his c,(fcft n1ltlgatCS LIIP impact of a prcfcrc.ncc shock.
7 Conclusions
This pape.r has developed an endogenous growth model that incorporates pollution-
saving technological change and, at the same time, includes the natural environment as
a mnewable resource. The modrl simult.aneously determines the time paths for three
Lypr`s u( assr~ls: rcnr~wablr~ r~~suurc~-s, physical capital, and knuwlodgr~. 'I'hc accvmulxtion
of these three asset stocks is affected by the endogenous flows of, respectively, pollution,
saving, and inputs into the RBtD sector. The ratio of physical capital to knowledge
constitutes a measure for the direction of technological progress. In particular, if this
ratio declines, technological progress becomes more pollution saving.
Section 3 derived the conditions under which sustainable balanced growth is not only
feasible btlt also optimal. In such a situation, consumption and man-made inputa (knowl-
edge and physical capital) are growing, while the flow of pollution and the stock of natural
capital remain constant. 1'his implies that the shadow price of natural resources rises
over time, thereby encouraging substitution away from environmental services toward
consumption and the input of man-made factors of production. Constant environmental
quality is fcasible and optimal only if these substitution effects offset exactly the income
e(fects due to the growth in productivity. Hence, balanced optimal growth requires uni-
tary elasticities of substitution between environmental services and consumption in the38
utility function and between environmental services and man-made factors of production
in the production functions. Furthermore, it muat be excluded that technologies with
decreasing (increasing) returns to acale in the man-made factors become dominant in
the economy as a whole, since this would imply ever-falling (increasing) rates of growth.
How the government should intervene to achieve optimal growth was inveatigated
in Section 4. Private agents do not internalize the adverse effect of pollution on the
aggregate stock of natural capital; a tax on pollution is therefore necessary. This tax
should rise at the growth rate of pollution-saving knowledge, since the development of
new technology raises the productivity oí polluting inputs and provides ceter~ís paribusan
incentive to increase pollution. Pollution-saving knowledge is a public good and should
thus be provided by the government. We found that the government should earmark only
part of the revenues from the pollution tax for investing in pollution-saving knowledge.
Intuitively, the tax revenues measure the return on pollution-saving knowledge. As a
kind of golden rule, the government should 'conaume' part of this return.
Section 5 explored the link between, on the one hand, long-run growth and, on the
other hand, a more ambitious environmental policy, which is associated with a smaller
aggregate flow of pollution and, in a market economy, a higher pollution tax. Section
6 showed that the experiment performed in Section 5 can be interpreted as a shift in
preferences towards more concern for the environment. Section 5 distinguished between
the case in which the non-extractive use of the natural environment enters only the utility
function and the case in which it enters also the production function for final gooda.
Environmental policy reduces in the extractive use of the environment. If environmental
quality dces not enter production, this implies that the productivities of both kinds of
man-made capital decline and that the rates of return and growth fall. The adverse
impact on long-run growth is especially serious if pollution plays an important role in
the final good sector, while at the same time physical capital accounts for only a small
production share in the learning sector. The growth impact of environmental policy
is changed if environmental quality enhances production in the final goods sector. In
particular, long-run growth may benefit from environmental policy if lower pollution
exerts a strong positive long-run impact on the sustainable stock of natural capital while39
natural and physical capital account for large production ahares.
We explored also the impact of environmental policy on the bias of technological
change, the size of the public sector, and the role of various elasticities of aubstitution.
Technology becomes more pollution saving (indicated by a smaller capital to knowledge
ratio), the more difficult substitution is between capital ánd polluting inputs and the
smaller is the productive role of the environment. However, if substitution is easy and
the environment is directly productive in the capital goods sector, the supply of capital is
boosted and the economy relies more on physical capital and less on knowledge to replace
pollution. Increased environmental concern typically raises activity in the learning sector,
thereby expanding the relative importance of public spending. This effect is particularly
large if substitution between capital and knowledge is difíicult and if the environment
enhances the productivity of the capital-producing sector.
An obvious extension of this paper is to study the transitional dynamics of the model.
The short-term effects of environmental policy on growth are likely to be negative. In
early stages, the reduction in polluting inputs dominates (cí. the case that ay - 0
analyzed in this paper), while only in later stages the stock of environmental services
will have risen cnough to boost growth (cf. ay 1 0). Another valuableextension involves
the incorporation of public spending on abatement. In that case, distortionary taxes may
be required to finance public spending if lump-sum taxes are not available.40
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Appendix A
Eliminating q~ from (2.6) and (2.7), we find:
aY~axy a!l~aK„
aY~azy - ax~azy
The initial steady-state version of (A.1) is:




On a balanced growth path (i.e. q~, - 0), the optimal choice between investing in capital
and technological knowledge is characterized by (see 2.9)):
aKy - pazH - r (A.3)
where we have assumed èH - 6h. - 0. Defining C~K - x and K~lti - gq. so that
Y~K - x~ gh-, and noting that in the steady state h~h - gh - g~ - g, we can write
(A.3) as:
u(g}x)- (1-ij)g-r(1 - v) (A.4)
Solving for v, we find (3.9). Substituting (3.9) into (A.2) to eliminate v and solving for
u, we arrive at (3.8).
Log-linearizing (A.1) and (A.3), we find
Y(zY-KY1- ~(ZH-KN) (A.5)
(1 - ~) R )
~Yf (Zy-tiy)-ÀH-~P--(ZH-tiH)-r (A.6
Oy pH42
These two equationa yield the aolutiona for the sectoral factor intensities (5.1). Sub-
stituting theae sotutiona in (A.6), we find expresaion (5.4) for the effect on the rate of
return r.
Appendix B
The growth rate oí knowledge, gq - h~h, ia found from (3.5):
AyG( Hy, Zy)
l hI 9N -











1-v ( 1-a-fp )
Subatituting (5.3) and (5.4), we find (5.7).





Combining (B.4) and (B.5) and defining z- K~h as the capital to knowledge ratio, we
find:
(KY - Zy) - (Z - P) ~ U - V (B.Ó)43





Subtracting (B.7) from (B.8), we artive at:




Subatituting the steady-state solutiona for (Ky - Zy) and (Ky - Zy) from (5.1) and for
v from (5.7), we can solve for the long-run solutions for u and z- P.
In particular, subtraction of (B.6) from (B.9) and multiplying the result by v yields:
V{(KN - ZH) -(KY - Zy)} --( 1 V u)U f(1 v v) V (B.lO)
Substituting (5.1) and (5.7) into (B.10) yields expression (5.8) for n.
In order to find the steady-state solution for i, we write (B.9) as:
u u v-ul v l
i-Pt(Ky-Zy)-}'C1-u
u- 1-v v-C v IC1-vIv
(B.11)
Substitution uf (B.10) (a(tcr multiplying with uw) into (B.11) yields
z-P-~(1-u)(Ky-Zy)fu(Ky-Zy)-Cvvu~Cl
vvlv






The growth rate of the capital atock, gK - K~K, ia found by aubatituting (3.4) into
(2.4)
AyF(Ky,Fj.)Ky C
gK - Ky K - K
where we have used bK - 0. Log-linearization of (C.1) yielda:
(C.1)
99K -(9 f x) ~AY f (1 - a)(Py - Ky) i- UJ - x2 (C.i)
where x - C~K. Subatitution of gK - g, (5.1), (5.3), and (5.8) yielda:
xi-(9fx)~ff((1-Qy)(1-~)f(1-u)(ay-aH)f(1-u)p(aH-1))
Ay-Ày-P 1-u d r
r1~- B l r C.3
( 1-afA )- v (r-B) }-9I r-BJ ( )
where we have used (5.4) to eliminate Ay. We can write (C.3) as
gfx ( v-~ (Ay-Ày-P
2- x I(1-oy)(u-~)f(1-oy) v(1-u)J
` 1-~-fQ )f
~1 -~ B~ f 9 t(g } x) (1 - u)~J r C.4
r-B `x x v ( )




where a„ is defined in (5.11).45
We express g f x in terms of g and r by using ( A.4) and (3.8):
) u Ir-g t QgI (9tx
-ár-r~a(r-g)fQg)
Llsing (C.6), we arrive at t in the initial ateady atate:
x-(r - g)Ir f g(Q - a)~
~(r - 9) f Q9
We also find Írom (3.8):
and





~T(r - g) f Qg fQgl







We can now use (C.6)-(C.10) to write the first term in squared brackets at the right-hand




(C.11) r f g((i - a) Lar f g(~3 - a)
We can simplify the term in front of i' at the right-hand side of (C.4) by using (derived
from (C.6), (C.7), (C.9) and (3.9))
g (g f xl (1 - u g g(Q - a)(1 - a)r
x}` x I` v ~- r- 9} Iar f g(Q - ~)~(r f g(Q - a)~
(C.12)




Subatituting (C.12) and (C.13) to rewrite the term in front of r in (C.4), we find:
1-(r B B) lx } lg x x~ `1 v nIJ -
r g(~ - a) ( 1 - a)r 6
r-g rfg(~-a) ar-~g(~-a) r-B (1-~) - - J(-)
Substitution of (C.I1) and (C.14) into (C.4) yields (5.13).
Appendix D
Log-linearization of (2.1 ) yi~lds:
1V - ENIV f (ENP) P (D.1)
In the steady state, N- 0. Hence, the long-run relationship between the flow of pollution
and the stock of natural capital is given by
N - - `ENNI
P (D.2)
Log-linearization of EN yields:
ENNN ENPP
ÈN -( EN ) N f( EN ) P. (D.3)
From the utility function U- U(c, N), we find:
uN - (1~ - mf ~a(Ua~U`)) ~UN~U~~ c-} ~a( áNU~)1 ~U ~U~~ N (D.4)
where ~ is an exogenous preference shock. In Section 3 we showed that the elasticity of47
UN~U~ with respect to consumption should equal unity to guarantee balanced growth.
If we write -a for the second elasticity in (D.4) and subatitute (D.2) and c - C- L, we
arrive at:
Ux-U~-~f(C-L)tx`ENNIP (D.5)
)~om production functions (3.4) and (3.5) and equation (5.1) we find:
(~3Y~~3'I,y)-Ayt Y(hy-Py)-AYfn(A1-cr-fJiP) (D.6)
(8H~8Zer) - Ày -~ Q ~lfy - Py~ - Ay -F ~ ~Ay - Ày - P1
(D.7)
oy ` 1-af~ J
Combining (4.1), (5.4), and (D.6), we find (5.15). (5.16) is found by log-linearizing
(2.6) and substituting (D.6) and (D.7).
The arbitrage-condition (6.1) in the steady state can be written as:
LUN jU~ ( u l P
h(8Y~8Zy ) } ay `1 - a I N- r- g-~ 6N (D.8)
Log-linearizing of (6.1) and substituting (D.8), we find:
[r-gtÁrv-ay(1 va~NJ(LfUN-U~)f~y`1
vaI N~(8N)-
rr - 99 - ~NEN (D.9)
Substituting (5.3), (D.2), (D.3), (D.5) and ( D.6) into (D.9) yields (6.2) in the case
that ay - 0.
Finally, we arrive at (5.17) by using





aud substituting (F3.4), (13.7) and (5.1), and then employing (5.7) to eliminate v and
(5.16) to rewrite qh.48
Table 1:
The long-run impacta of productivity ahocks and environmental policy'.
Productivity shocks Environmental policy (P G 0)
R.elative shocks Aggregate shocka Environment not Environment
(Ay - Ay 1 0) r' ~ 0 productive ay - 0 productive ay ~ 0
KY - ZY f 0 f ff
ICy - Zy ~- 0 f ~f
g 0 f - -J.}
v -z - a
u -' - -s
ÍC - h fs f' -s -Jf
C - Íf t t9 -J-4. -Jt
C-h f f - -Jt
TP - Ji f f f f~
9e f 0 -' -Jt
Footnotes
1) The substitution elasticities oy and oy and the intertemporal elasticity o are assumed
not to exceed 1.
2) 0 ií oy - 1.
3) Unless o and vy are large.
4) Unless oy is large compared to oy and, at the same time, r 1~ g(so that v ~~ Q).
5) Unless o and oy are large.
6) Unless Q C o and, at the same time, oy and oy are small.
7) Unless ~i c a.
8) Unless Q C a and, at the same time, oy and oy are large.
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